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This article develops Jurgen Habermas' emphasis on critical theory as a means to retrieve the social and 
restore its place as a central concept in the social sciences. It argues that Habermas has been 
misinterpreted by varieties of thinkers across political, ideological, and intellectual domains; and has 
been misused by neo-conservatives and postmodernists in particular. Habermas' critical theory is driven 
by an emphasis on social and political praxis, and establishes the possibility of an authentic social 
existence. At the base of this existence is a solid moral order that defines human existence in terms of 
Reason rather than in terms of Power. In effect, civil society is possible when humanity can be free to 
engage in an informed political discourse that is based on shared understandings of legal and societal 
normative structures.  
Echoes:  
There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families.  
Margaret Thatcher, quoted in The Observer (1 November 1988)  
"Society" is not a valid object of discourse. There is no underlying (constituting) principle.  
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic 
Politics (1985)  
Sociology can only depict the expansion of the social and its vicissitudes. It survives only on the positive 
and definitive hypothesis of the social. The reabsorption, the implosion of the social escapes it. The 
hypothesis of the death of the social is also that of its own death:  
Jean Baudrillard. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . . . or the End of the Social (1983)  
We are . . . inhabitants of another Time and another Space, and we no longer know what response is 
adequate to our reality.  
Ihab Hassan. "POSTmodernISM" (1975)  
Awesome! Triple awesome!!! Funkarheumatech!!!!  
The metaphors of the young.  
We are very much full of postmodernist metaphors and style. Whether we are truly past the modern 
epoch may be another story.  
Jean Baudrillard sees America as the postmodern "utopia achieved." Synonyms for postmodern are 
siderale (astral), hyper-real and terrifiante (Awesome!). Baudrillard sees Americanization and 
postmodernism as involving emptiness, a harrowing emptiness. The metaphor of the desert is used over 
and over and over again. We are in an epoch that banishes all sociality, sentimentality and sexuality. 
Proteus redux. Robert Musil's The Man Without Qualities is the paradigm.  
But despite the nihilist bravado and lack of faith in any collective sense of reason, social movements 
flower. New public spheres are continuously being constituted. 1989 turned out to be neither the 
celebration of the French Revolution nor the dawning of a new postmodern Aquarius: over-produced 
commodities, postcards and televisuals. It was the year of the democracy movements in Tiananmen 
Square, of Civic Forum, New Forum, Vaclev Havel, and the Velvet Revolution that made Frank Zappa safe 
for Czechoslovakia. It was a year of rebirth for democratic social movements and their projection of 
alternative and transcendent collective identity.  
The social was visible again.  
And the quest for a retrieval of some sense of civil society moved from the domain of theoreticians to 
the streets once more. What has prevailed in Eastern Europe is double-edged: the world sovereignty of 
capital, and the struggle to affirm universal civil and social rights, entitlement and their constitutional 
guarantee.  
To what degree do Eastern Europeans have an authentic humus of civil society, a usable tradition for 
civic association, multiple access, consent-minded liberalism and constitutionalism? The East European 
social movements of the 1980s manifest a persistent concern for the development of non-commodity 
forms subject to popular democratic controls, social solidarity and the struggle for social justice. Can 
these movements and their institutionalization provide a moral yet proceduralist discipline to the ever-
evolving world system of integrating circuits of exchange?  
This article shows us how Jurgen Habermas' strand of critical theory helps us retrieve this concept from 
its inauthentic appropriation by the neo-conservatives and its premature burial by the postmodernists. 
Postmodernism is disturbed from within. Once under the skin of modernism's own genealogy, its own 
living tradition, we are confronted by the once more released shock of the old.  
Habermas' strand of critical theory holds out the possibility of social solidarity and moral community 
that can still ground individuals bound by normative evaluations for which individuals are held 
responsible, for which we are responsible to sustain, and by which we intersubjectively sustain our 
capacity to comprehend the "Autonomy of Reason."  
Versus the postmodernists, Habermas understands: how Reason both becomes Power and checks 
Power; how Reason constitutes individuals as subjects with an intersubjectively meaningful order within 
a seemingly meaningless modem universe.  
Habermas seeks to transcend the uncoupling of law and morality. Law is not Caesar's will, but that by 
which Caesar is judged, by which voluntas is checked by ratio. The validity of law rests not on the will of 
the Prince, divine authority or consanguinity, but on the obligation to observe discourse ethics, to use 
the logic of argumentation, to raise claims of normative rightness, to be accountable.  
How can we constitute ourselves?  
How can we avoid entropic dissensus?  
How do we attain and institutionalize a self-disciplinary consensus--i.e., a moral discipline rather than a 
statist discipline--that protects us, enables us and empowers us?  
To the extent that these questions persist both among the philosophes and in the streets, social theory 
persists, rather than founders and shipwrecks on a Postmodernist ontology of power.  
THE POSTMODERN SENSIBILITY  
The image of New York City, actually Manhattan, has been transformed during the past two decades--
transformed from the once throbbing heart of America's steely modernist civilization to "a system which 
is composed from its own explosion" and constitutes itself out of its own decay".[ n1] We are 
increasingly confronted with either anti-modernist or post-modernist representations filled with doubt 
and despair: the gray and grimy sameness of Manhattan, Paris's La Defense and Hamburg in Wim 
Wenders' film The American Friend; the character of Winnie sitting blissfully and talking aimlessly within 
a pile of garbage heaped up to her neck in Samuel Beckett's play Happy Days; Joseph Beuys' sculpture of 
a Volkswagen bus tied to twenty sledges, each carrying felt, fat and searchlight.  
In his well-received TV series and book The Shock of the New, Robert Hughes[ n2] perceptively noted 
that  
. . . the idea that we are in a "post-modernist" culture has been a commonplace since the mid-seventies 
.... [Modernist] reflexes still jerk, the severed limbs still twitch, the parts are still there; but they no 
longer connect or function as a lived whole. The modernist achievement will continue to affect culture 
for another century at least, because it was large, so imposing and so irrefutably convincing. But its 
dynamic is gone, and our relationship to it is becoming archaeological.  
With this sense of depasse mounting, Jurgen Habermas in his 1981 James Lecture at New York 
University--polemically entitled "Modernity versus Postmodernity"--took on various anti-modernist 
currents in Western criticism. The lecture, delivered a year before as the Theodor Adorno Prize Lecture 
of the city of Frankfurt, a.M., was originally and more accurately entitled "Modernity--An Incomplete 
Project." Habermas hits hard on Western intellectuals' failure to provide any vision for the closing 
decades of the century. Specifically he attacks any form of aestheticism that ignores this problem.  
Postmodernism, a radicalization of the logic inherent in modernism, sees itself as the true modernism as 
opposed to the distorted, instrumentalized, and manipulated modernism that has become 
institutionalized as the official culture. Traditional modernist lines between mind and body, self and 
other are wiped away. There is a search for alternatives in our relationship with subjectivity, with 
narration, and with nature--including the nature of our bodies. Pure temporality is unabashedly asserted 
as it mirrors the dissolution of the Enlightenment's sense of history unfolding--the seeming failure of 
history to transcend itself, the solidifying of history at an inhumane moment and the inability of the 
dialectic to move beyond affirmation.  
Postmodernism is driven by a vision of freedom that is essentially post-Marxist. It is a vision that 
displaces any particular totalizing project--a vision of freedom in which humans are freed from the 
obligation to progress, and the compulsion to enslave others in order to make progress possible.  
As in the late films of lean Luc Godard or songs like "Language is a Virus" by Laurie Anderson, there is in 
postmodernism a "morose conviction that speaking will never disclose anything".[ n3] There is more of a 
suggestion of Nietzschian Niedergang or drive toward catastrophe, than a Hegelian Aufhebung to a 
higher rationality.  
And as Charles Jencks writes in 1986,[ n4] postmodernism offers us a double coding, a paradoxical 
dualism:  
(T)he continuation of Modernism and its transcendence . . . Of one thing we can be sure: the 
announcement of death is, until the other Modernisms disappear, premature . . . There is the same 
snake-like dialectic which the movement has a shown, and one suspects that there will be several more 
surprising twists of the coil before it is finished.  
Habermas' project is the quest for that form of life where social institutions and practices can exist that 
permit free, responsible, and nonideological social discourse in which we can intersubjectively 
constitute a universal public sphere of communication. Habermas' redefinition of critical theory starts 
with communication in which implicitly raised validity claims are naively accepted, but focuses in on 
those emergent situations in which one or more of those validity claims becomes problematical. Such 
situations develop when the accepted framework of norms and opinions is called into question, and the 
claims which were previously implicit now require discursive justification. For Habermas, the validity of 
problematic truth claims or problematic norms can be "redeemed" only by entering into a discourse 
which has the purpose of judging the truth of the problematic opinion or the correctness of the 
problematic norm. Questions of legitimation become the focus. And to a universal grammar of 
intersubjective discourse is attributed the position of a transcendental horizon of communicative praxis.  
Postmodernist experimentalism, on the other hand, seems more interested in grammar as a playground 
for language games as in Wittgenstein, or as some sort of prison-house by which la langue (a 
grammatical structure) constrains le langage (collective discourse) or practice) and la parole (individual 
speech acts). Speech acts and the consequent discourse represent the signifying components of the 
cultural life-world. And this cultural life-world is never fixed but rather in a perpetual state of creative 
effort to cope with its natural and objectified environment[.[ n5] Indeed, given alleged diseases of verbal 
systems (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre) and "the Retreat from the Word" (George Steine[ n6]), we 
have John Cage and Elie Wiesel listening to the sounds of silence and Susan Sontag (1969) even 
fashioning an "aesthetics of silence."  
In contrast to Habermas' totalizing/universalizing project, postmodernist experimentation in its radical 
pluralism recognizes  
radically different language games and leads to an implicit and explicit cultural and political assessment, 
which sees the possibilities for a progressive praxis in what he calls the "legitimation par la paralogie" 
which no longer searches for universal consensus, but for a consensus which <<doit etre local.>>[ n7]  
RETRIEVING CIVIL SOCIETY  
Historically, from the 19th century on, civil society came to mean a domain of interaction distinct from 
the state, and protected from state interference. For G.W.F. Hegel the dynamic of civil society as a 
system of mutual interdependence necessitates the creation of institutions which limit the private 
autonomy of individuals bent on satisfying their selfish interests. Hegel--like Durkheim after him--
replaced political democracy in the modern highly differentiated social world by participation in 
nonpolitical organizations such as corporations or professional associations. He never accepted the 
radical implications of the rights of the citizen as distinct from the rights of man posed by Rousseau and 
grasped by Marx after him. An alternative to Hegel and Durkheim's social integrationist project would be 
a repoliticization of public spaces, a revitalization of the values and norms of participatory democracy--
out of which could emerge the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) or collective conscience transcending difference 
which civil society, in the liberal sense, lacks.[ n8]  
For the current of critical theory represented by Habermas, civil society is the domain out of which the 
reflective, creative and institutionalizing potential of group needs and interests are embodied in 
autonomous public spheres. Civil society is understood as being comprised of a plurality of social 
institutions such as productive units, households, voluntary organizations and community-based 
services legally guaranteed; and not just a non-statist sphere dominated by privately owned enterprises 
and patriarchical family arrangements. A pluralist society of men and women deliberating and acting in a 
participating collective order is posed as the basis of political obligation and legitimacy, rather than the 
individual consent of liberalism. With this in mind, Arato and Cohen[ n9] note how  
The contemporary (social) movements demonstrate that if the norms of civil society (plurality, publicity, 
democratic association) no longer have sufficient motivating power for twentieth century liberalism, 
they still inform the identities and projects of social actors, albeit in radicalized and reinterpreted 
versions.  
Habermas' critical politics requires a strategic appreciation of the reflexivity potential that is the 
supportive consensus of a civil society--as well as a strategic confrontational stirring of signifying 
practices. Such a strategic appreciation and stirring represent the x in EP = TR + X. Emancipatory 
practices (EP) result from a dialectical consideration of both the transcendental rules (TR) of universal 
pragmatics and the strategic confrontations the normative potential of a civil society can generate in 
attempting to overcome some already institutionalized distortion of communication.  
Following the reception of Gramscian ideas in Western Marxism, there has been a renewed focus on 
civil society, understood as the domain out of which the reflective, creative and institutionalizing 
potential of group needs are embodied. Confronted with what remains of the present-day corporatist 
impasse of social democracy and the statism of "already existing socialism," there has emerged--a 
Newer Left--e.g., Paul Hirst, John Keane, David Held; Andrew Arato and lean Cohen.[ n10] This Newer 
Left comes with ( 1) images of a conceivable "socialist civil society;" ( 2) constitutional concerns 
regarding the prevention of a cumulation of power at the center and the need for institutional checks 
and balances; ( 3) strategies for the development of non-commodity firms subject to popular democratic 
control; and ( 4) a concern with the diffusion of power beyond the state, the reality of plural sites of 
sociological sovereigns as well as an obsession with the achievement of pluralism without relativism. 
This Newer Left focuses not on chimeras, purely imaginary and stipulatively ideal conditions, but on 
specific institutions and redeemable institutional tendencies--both actual and potential--already implicit 
yet blocked within the development of liberal societies. What is avoided is the arbitrary imposition of 
some new form of life.  
Socialism is understood as both a process and as an outcome, civil society as a stage and as a means 
(i.e., normative, legal, constitutional). Civil society can be conceived as a theatre of constitutive 
interaction, as a field of historicity dialectically organized by some dominant political economy, a field of 
unsynthesized paradoxes, antinomies, contradictions. What is sought is rational self-reflection regarding 
institutions, law and their development. Consciousness of the normative potential of civil society is 
understood as the active principle: the capacity for reasoned collective agency, the procedural basis for 
the institutionalization of a new collective rationality, of a moral rather than a statist discipline.  
There is also a reflexive concern with the autonomy of law and the state, with the contingent wants 
protected by the juridical order. Law is not understood as purely command (voluntas) as in Thomas 
Hobbes, John Austin or Carl Schmitt.[ n11] It is understood as voluntas plus ratio, i.e., the voice of 
reason, as sovereign will plus the developing collective reason of civil society: its normative potential, its 
web of procedures, institutions, constitutions. To what extent does such a juridical order of practical 
reasoning founder against the rocks of sovereignty? To what extent is the procedural divorced from the 
realm of communicative action?  
Such an institutionalist and proceduralist turning amounts to a reaction to what is perceived to be the 
impoverished condition of Marxist theories of normative integration and constitutionalism. The real 
bond is understood as the civil. As Marx himself understood it is not manipulative statist or corporatist 
institutions that sustain and rationalize civil society, but vice versa. Too often social democrats have 
focused on the statization of society rather than the socialization of the state. The regulatory institutions 
and voluntarism of civil society constitute the ethical root of the state. Politics and law need not be 
equated with relations of domination, discipline and punishment.  
What is connoted is something akin to the theory of societal constitutionalism expounded by the likes of 
Anthony Giddens and Jurgen Habermas--the possibility of establishing a grounded basis upon which to 
describe and evaluate the direction of institutional changes in modern society, to specify threshold 
levels in the development of voluntaristic procedural restraints on the systemic pressures of 
bureaucratization (i.e., purposive/instrumental rationality). It is a grounding in the procedures of 
pratical/moral rationality--one that opens up discourse to a generalizable consensus rather than sealing 
it off within bounds of privilege and selectivity.  
ANOTHER STRAND OF CRITICAL THEORY: PROCEDURALISM AND RULES JURISPRUDENCE  
The critical theory of society associated with two generations of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, 
Benjamin, Marcuse, Habermas) emerged as an alternative paradigm to the traditional or positive theory 
of society; it recognized that along with its greatest triumphs, modern reason has brought about the 
greatest of brutalities. For Adorno, after Auschwitz, modern reason must be unwilling to exist in a state 
of affirmative contentment, in a condition of dialectical non-self consciousness--as part of the 
unconscious participation in the disenchanting rationalization process described by Max Weber as 
modernization. While it condemns modernity's affirmative sense of itself, critical theory affirms what 
Habermas calls "the incompleted project of modernity--the actualization of critical reason as a search 
for the sacred." Critical theory studies actually to subvert the actually existing. Critical theory attacks the 
social amnesia of all those who look to the future ignoring the dead and dying.  
Critical theory has never minimized the reflective efforts necessary to realize the immanent possibilities 
present, to constitute qualitatively new frameworks of experience, new normative principles of social 
integration. Yet at the same time, Habermas[ n12] points to the dangers of "shattering the containers of 
autonomously developed cultural spheres" and their subversive content. This is the Frankfurt School's 
continued stress on what Benjamin referred to as the "need to produce the permanently treasurable."  
It may be argued that there have been two strands in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. One 
emphasizes aesthetic experience as a prefigurative indicator of spiritual redemption (Adorno, Benjamin, 
Marcuse). The other emphasizes rational self-reflection as a critical tool in the struggle to attain the 
telos of humankind in its universalizing condition as rational members of a socio-historical species. It is 
in this latter strand--most markedly developed by the second generation critical theorist Habermas and 
in an earlier generation by such fellow travelers of the Frankfurt School as Franz Neumann (1900-1954) 
and Otto Kirchheimer (1905-1965)[ n13]--that the contribution of the Frankfurt School to political theory 
can be grasped. This latter strand is concerned with institutional modes of political obligation and 
legitimation, and is ultimately linked to the contractarian and natural law traditions mediated by Hegel's 
considerations on the ethical and institutional life (Sittlichkeit), that is, the civil society and the 
institution of the rule of law.  
There has been a rekindling of interest (e.g.) in the writings of Franz Neumann on Weimar social law[ 
n14] and the 1936 London School of Economics (LSE) dissertation, The Rule of Law[ n15] he wrote under 
the direction of Harold Laski and Karl Mannheim. As Roger Cotterrell[ n16] has recently noted (1988), 
these writings confront a new society of mass organizations, economic concentration, and 
administrative bureaucracies with a "procedural insistence on government, through fixed, generalizable 
and previously announced regulations and standards." They offer us a Left proceduralism or rules 
jurisprudence to counter the liberal one posed by Friedrich von Hayek and so often appropriated by the 
Right. These writings of Neumann precede his famous 1941 work on the Third Reich, Behemoth (1942).[ 
n17] The strict historical materialist analysis of this latter work diverges from his more subtle Marxist 
sociology of law in the Weimar era and his 1930s reflections on how corporatist and statist forces in an 
epoch of organized capitalism subvert the principle of legal generality.[ n18] For in the more competitive 
epoch of laissez-faire/liberal capitalism, the "generality" of the rule of law served a moral and equalizing 
function.  
Neumann struggled to establish and defend the constitutional rights of trade unions and the institutions 
of labor law. He tried to get beyond the liberal Rechtsstaat of parliamentary democracy and provide the 
collective basis for a modern social republic (sozialer Rechtsstaat). He attempted to establish the 
reflective, creative, and institutionalizing potential of group needs and interests rather than the 
individual consent of liberalism as the basis of political obligation.  
Moving on from the Austro-Marxist Karl Renner (1870--1956), Neumann developed a sociological 
understanding of the evolution of legal political institutions as structures of rationality. Neumann 
contended that any liberal legal system is incapable of being considered "fully rational" if it failed to 
recognize the consequences of concentrated socioeconomic power associated with the particularistic 
interests of private capital in civil society. Like his teacher Hugo Sinzheimer (1875--1945)[ n19] and his 
colleague Kirchheimer, Neumann looked to the immanent potential of social laws and rights in the 
Weimar Constitution to procedurally facilitate the continual struggle for a free and rational civil society.  
He would argue that there is a powerful intellectual tradition from which we can extract the following 
lineage for a critical sociology of law.  
The Austro-German School of Sociological Jurisprudence (Eugen Ehrlich, Rudolph von Ihering, Karl 
Renner, Hans Kelsen, Georg Jellinek, Otto Bauer);[ n20]  
Multi-disciplinary/historical social science of which Marx and Weber are the two outstanding 
representatives; and  
Weimar social democratic and Marxist labor lawyers, some fellow travelers of the original Frankfurt 
School (Neumann, his partner Ernst Frankel,[ n21] his teacher Hugo Sinzheimer, and Sinzheimer's other 
significant students Otto Kirchheimer and Otto Kahn-Freund[ n22]). Hermann Heller,[ n23] another key 
social democratic jurisprudence professor, can be added here.  
Neumann's earliest attitudes about politics and law were profoundly influenced by Renner and 
Sinzheimer. Renner provided Neumann with a Marxist superstructural interpretation of law and social 
change and general appreciation for the sociological approach to the study of law. Sinzheimer combined 
Renner's legal sociology with the Genossenschaft theory of Otto Gierke to create the fundamental 
concepts of modern labor law and helped to focus Neumann's intellectual energies on the problems of 
the labor movement.  
Renner had to work around Marx's statements to the effect that law was simply part of the ideological 
superstructure of society, a means of class domination dependent on the prevailing productive 
relationships in the economic substructure. He refused to explain how social forces create or 
substantially change law, and he did not attempt to determine how and why legal principles come into 
being during specific historical periods. He asked only how the social function of law changes, how 
capitalism adapts precapitalist legal institutions for its own uses.  
Sinzheimer had stressed peaceful, evolutionary gains to be won through the reform of Weimar labor 
law. Participating in the framing of the Weimar Constitution, Sinzheimer was probably the first to 
lecture on labor law in Germany. Making use of the Genossenschaft theory of Otto Gierke[ n24], 
Sinzheimer challenged the "concession theory" of legal groups of German positive and Roman law. Like 
Maitland and Figgis in England, he argued that social groups are "organic entities," autonomously 
capable of willing and acting, rather than legally fictitious personalities. These authentic group 
personalities make their own rules--what Gierke called "social law." Collective bargaining agreements fit 
this new category. Gierke's theory meant chat labor unions as well as employer associations were 
legitimate groups with rights and duties, and because they were not fictitious persons as understood 
under Roman law, they did not require someone else to represent them; these groups could speak 
through their own organs in ways determined by their own internal rules, i.e., their own substantive 
rationality. Members of these two types of groups, trade unions and employer associations, were all 
part of a third and more inclusive type of group determined by industry. Employers and employees 
within specific industries thus had the right to decide among themselves about the particulars of their 
industrial relationship. Because such decisions necessarily had the character of what Gierke called 
"social law," the collective agreement regulating the conditions of work had the force of law and took 
legal priority over the simple individual labor contract.  
Neumann looked to the immanent potential of social laws, social rights, and a socialist interpretation of 
the Weimar Constitution put in the service of social equality and freedom. Neumann's critical sociology 
of law starts in the conflict between the constitutional rule of law and the imperatives of socioeconomic 
systems transcending them. Its critical purpose is to sociologically understand the functions of legal and 
constitutional institutions and how they may be reconstituted to serve the purposes of universalizable 
interests.  
Neumann's constitutional reinterpretation was designed to help adjust the legal-political superstructure 
of German society to the changes in the economic substructure chat had occurred before 1930. He was 
attempting to institutionalize the growing participation of the working class in the administration of the 
economy, participation that had been made possible by the Revolution of 1918 and the Weimar 
Constitution.  
Neumann and Sinzheimer recoiled in the middle of the 1930s from their institutionalist legal theory, 
which they had used to justify workers councils and collectivist democracy. This theory presents a model 
in which the individual persons, whose wills constitute the primary legal relations in liberal legal 
systems, are replaced by members of constituted communities whose legal aims and duties somehow 
derive from the objective character of those communities. Ironically, fascist jurisprudence used this 
rationale to destroy free trade unions. Shocked by this unintended consequence, Neumann moved to a 
more Leninist position with Kirchheimer in the middle 1930s.  
Neumann, Sinzheimer, and later Otto Kahn-Freund (1900-1979) saw institutionalism depending on 
organized workers' resistance to the domination of property and on the implementation of economic 
democracy. They resisted any "free law" discretion or politicized interpretation by jurists. Neumann, 
Sinzheimer, and Kahn-Freund emphasized a rules-jurisprudence based on rationally extracting rules and 
emphasizing procedures versus the more standards-jurisprudence of their contemporary Ludwig Bendix-
-or Duncan Kennedy[ n25] today. The latter employed standards outside the evolving law--i,e., evolving 
both linearly and dialectically--and free discretion by jurists.  
In The Rule of Law, Neumann stressed the significance of the generality of the law and the normative 
potential of civil society. He came to see civil society as an immanently intelligible historical experience 
by which voluntaristic procedural norms evolve dialectically. The hard experience for Neumann was his 
realization of socialist civil society's dialectical rather than linear evolution.  
In his 1950s return to the construction of the social Rechtsstaat, Neumann moved beyond both Renner's 
functionalist analysis of the intended and unintended consequences of legal institutions and 
Sinzheimer's institutionalism. Neumann pushed the critical sociology of law to an analysis of ideological 
functions of law and the immanent normative potential of law.[ n26] Hence, Neumann develops an 
immanent critique method of legal sociology that meshes with the proceduralism of Habermas and the 
quasi-transcendent critique Habermas adds as a capstone.  
For Neumann and Habermas, we can grasp the dialectical working-out of a constitutive emancipatory 
reason, the juridico-discursive order. It is an order with an immanent relation to truth--not to just what 
is sociologically universalizable (such as the "false" universal of commodification Marxism posits), but to 
what is critically, i.e., quasi-transcendentally, universalizable.  
Much in the manner of the more liberal American theorists Lon Fuller and Talcott Parsons, they focus on 
the overarching procedural restraints that we voluntaristically and interactively create. For a strand of 
critical theory represented by Neumann and Habermas, socialism is a rational kernel of juridical 
categories and their redemptive claims--that is, rational objects of criticism to be interpreted and put 
into practice by progressive social involvements. For many who have been perplexed by the 
proceduralism of Habermas' recent turning to political theory and the sociology of law[ n27] a retrieval 
of the rich vein mined by Neumann brings this other strand of critical theory into sharp focus.  
From the theorizing of Neumann and Habermas--and those linked to them--we can derive a critical 
sociology of law. Law and constitutionalism can be understood in terms of both: ( 1) a proceduralistic 
critique derived from a transcendental logic that serves as the foundation of language, 
communicative/interactive competency, and hence practical-moral rationality; and ( 2) an immanent 
critique of concrete practices vis-a-vis their institutional function and normative potential. It is a 
conjunction that becomes the problematic of this other strand of critical theory, the critical sociology of 
law.  
Emancipatory practices within juridico-discursive order are understood by contextuating socio-logic and 
immanent critique within the foundational or transcendental logic of speakingness.  
Thus, a lineage of a critical sociology can be summarized as follows:  
Positivism and Functionalism (Renner, Jellinek)  
Institutionalism and Group Theory (Sinzheimer, Gierke, Laski)  
Ideology-Critique and the threshold of Immanent Critique (Neumann)  
Immanent Critique's relation to Transcendent Critique (Habermas)  
Neumann ultimately found his dissertation, The Rule of Law too sociological, too focused on ideological 
functioning and without adequate recognition of the progressive character of the claims of natural law 
theories, that is, their legitimations. Neumann defined natural law as a set of rules expressed as a set of 
universally valid norms.  
In his LSE dissertation, Neumann argued that during the age of liberalism, with the ascendancy of the 
bourgeoisie, natural law gradually disappeared and was replaced by: the notion of the rule of law. 
Neumann admitted that the mechanistic philosophy of Descartes and the influence of Descartes and of 
Montesquieu helped to produce the idea that abstract general rules provide for calculable and 
predictable relations between states and citizens. And this notion of general rules became the core of 
the rule of law idea.  
Neumann contrasted specific general laws with what German jurisprudence referred to as 
Generalklauseln, or "general principles," which allow a judge to consider community standards of 
morality or fair play in making a decision. Such principles embody a "spurious generality," argued 
Neumann, because in modern class-divided society the community has no unanimous opinion about the 
nature of moral behavior.  
In the early 1970s, Habermas[ n28] emphasized the revolutionary component of rationalist natural law: 
how its normative claims need to be tied to evolving rationality structures that comprise a juridico-
discursive order. Habermas and his students sparked a revival of interest in Neumann and Neumann's 
ultimate recognition that sociologic cannot relieve transcendental logic of what Gillian Rose[ n29] calls 
"the unending trial of reason." Ultimately, categorical questions of jurisprudence cannot be recast in 
sociologic ones of repetitive interaction, function, and role.  
Against the institutionalists' recourse to external community standards and free discretion, Neumann 
held to a constitutive theory of jurisprudence with internal relations, with an inherent rationale. 
Jurisprudence enables us to logically and categorically connect principles of law. Sociological analysis 
was auxiliary to check whether social change had subjected these principles of law to such a change in 
function that their literal application would no longer make sense. Regardless of the class-bound nature 
or class-compromise nature of legal norms in their provenance--that is, the social law provisions of the 
Weimar Constitution--Neumann realized that these norms can be neutral in their effect. The ratio of 
their legitimation claims can be extracted and countered to the asymmetries of power.  
For Habermas, like Neumann before him, emancipatory reason is juridical. Emancipatory practices can 
be gauged by uncovering the unredeemed claims of civil society. Civil society is understood as the 
repository of all norms; out of the interactions and reciprocities of civil society, our norms are 
constituted. The constitution of a rational civil society is depicted in terms of its developed and arrested 
internal relations. Threshold levels can be discovered. Categorial social philosophy is linked to the 
problem of institutional development.  
Habermas' categorical analysis has an institutional frame. To what extent can we extract universalistic 
normative principles from their ideological shells? The discursively redemptive claims of our normative 
traditions are tested (placed on trial, so to speak). Habermas' theory of communicative action points to 
the link between law and morality that formalist analytical philosophy and positivist sociology of law 
sought to sever: there is an ultimate foundation, a transcendental ideal speech situation. There is a 
moral grounding to the law. Actually, Habermas sees his theory as quasi-transcendental, different from 
traditional Kantian foundationalism. He sees his theory of the ideal speech situation and pragmatics as 
providing the grounds not to elucidate all the conditions of possible reflection, but view of the "various 
conditions for the validity of meaningful expressions and performances."[ n30]  
Habermas seeks to preserve the generality of law without reverting to natural law. His is the generality 
of procedure, as grounded in the rationality of communicative ethics.  
Neumann and Habermas seek bulwarks against the disciplining forces of corporatist and statist 
prerogative associated with 20th century political economy. It is a degree of intervention never 
fathomed in the liberal Rechtsstaat constitutionalism of the 19th century, a constitutionalism of the 
19th century, a constitutionalism that sought solely to neutralize the state. The pluralism pointed to is 
not a pluralism of endless difference and carnivalesque free play. It is a pluralism of reconciliation and 
redemption--not in the name of totality but in the name of lawfulness.  
Habermas' theory of modernity accepts an irreversible differentiation process, a differentiation into 
three moments of reason: ( 1) science and technology, ( 2) law and morality, and ( 3) aesthetics. The 
critical theory of the Frankfurt School seeks to control the development of the first moment with the 
preservation and evolution of the latter two. Unlike a Marcuse, neither Neumann nor Habermas seeks 
to aestheticize politics. In their proceduralism they focus on the moment/sphere of law and morality. In 
their proceduralist turning, they seek to retrieve a foundation for connecting law and morality, and for 
intersubjectively sustaining our capacity for Rational Autonomy. Discourse is sustained and opened up, a 
proceeding toward a generalizable and self-disciplinary consensus.  
In applying the proceduralist rules of the ideal speech situation, Habermas' critical theorist does not play 
the role of an ultimate judge but that of a mediating interpreter ensuring that the differentiated cultural 
moments/spheres communicate with each other without "violating the inner logic of [that sphere's] 
dominant form of argumentation either in truth, normative correctness, or aesthetic harmony. The logic 
of the sphere of law and morality is based on legitimation, rather than on scientific validation or 
authenticity."[ n31] This logic of the sphere of law and morality is beyond the ever encroaching and 
disenchanting instrumental rationality Max Weber resigned himself to. It is the rationality intrinsic to the 
form of law itself, that secures the legitimacy of power.  
REDEEMING THE CLAIMS OF A JURIDICO-DISCURSIVE ORDER  
While we cannot nostalgically look backward into the future, the strand of critical theory connecting 
Neumann to Habermas reveals institutional thresholds in an immanently intelligible tradition of 
institutionalizing experience, an unfolding project of social rationalization--not the statization of reason, 
but vice versa. A post-Marxist Newer Left focuses on the dangers threatening the power-scrutinizing 
traditions of modernity--democratic liberal and democratic socialist aspirations embedded in historical 
forms of life, aspirations of citizenship rights, access and protection.  
To what extent can the normative claims and legacies of civil society persist?," these two movements 
ask. What links them with the Postmodernists is mutual aversion and struggle to overcome the 
overextension of systems of instrumentalist rationality that penetrate and "normalize" the lifeworld as 
steering mechanisms. Foucault's paradigm for such statist disciplinary apparata was Bentham's plan for 
the Panopticon (1791). Otto Kahn-Freund urged the British labor movement to preserve its collective 
autonomy and resist the corporatist pressures of Prime Minister Harold Wilson's Social Contract of the 
late 1960s and middle 1970s. A Newer Left seeks to deepen the divide between civil society and the 
state as a bulwark versus statist and corporatist disciplining, rather than anticipate the abolition of that 
dichotomy as Marx had argued.  
Neither Neumann, Kahn-Freund or Habermas of one tradition, Foucault or Lyotard of another, or a Paul 
Hirst or Vaclev Havel of the other look forward to a withering away of the state, a doing away with 
coercive sovereign power. Their collective focus is on "discipline," but discipline for what? Not a 
discipline based on fear on the lines of Hobbes or Schmitt, but a discipline based on consent, solidarity, 
and the pursuit of justice: a normative discipline rather than a statist one. To quote Habermas[ n32]:  
Justice conceived deontologically requires solidarity as its reverse. It is a question not so much of two 
movements that supplement each other as of two aspects of the same thing...Justice concerns the equal 
freedoms of unique and self-determining individuals, while solidarity concerns the welfare of 
consociates who are intimately linked in an intersubjectively shared form of life--and thus also to the 
maintenance of the integrity of this form of life itself. Moral norms cannot protect one without the 
other: they cannot protect the equal rights and freedoms of the individual without protecting the 
welfare of one's fellow man and of the community to which the individuals belong.  
Ultimately, Habermas' strand of critical theory locates emancipation in a juridico-discursive order, one 
which Postmodernists--fearful of the imperialism of rationality and the curtailment of the aesthetic--
depict as being shot full of domination, of a latent desire to impose an originary and privileged real. But 
what the allies of Habermas would see is the institutionalization of juridical subjectivity--a project of 
practical learning of disciplined self-reflection in accordance with the categorical logic of argumentation. 
What differentiates fin de siecle social theory in the 1990s from last time, is an aversion to messianism--
a restraint from designing and imposing some utopian/post-conventional form of life. For the likes of 
Habermas' the only utopian perspectives we can straightforwardly maintain now are of a procedural 
nature.[ n33]  
Within Postmodernists' own genealogy, one can fit Habermas' project alongside Maurice Merleau-
Ponty's methodological strategy of the"instituting subject" as sovereign--a strategy that gets us beyond 
the "ego-locial" predicament of the constituting subject,[ n34] and focuses on our intersubjectivity.  
Foucault[ n35] ultimately seeks "power without the King," a deconstruction of the relation between a 
sovereign and his subjects--the leitmotif characterizing the legal positivist tradition dating from John 
Bodin and Hobbes' model of Leviathan. "What we need," writes Foucault,[ n36]  
. . . is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore the 
problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory that still has to 
be done.  
Foucault may label too much as power/resistance. There are constraints requiring a variety of normative 
responses. Habermas questions how Foucault can explain--without normative criteria--the ebb and flow 
of domination/struggle and its consolidation into institutionalized power. How can Foucault expose 
arbitrariness, differentiate between better or worse, between Solidarity and Nazis, between S.O.S. 
Racisme and LePen's National Front? There is the freedom to act in concert--reconciling one's freedom 
with others--to transform old realities and both constitute and institutionalize new ones. This is the self-
constitution of society by social movements that Alain Touraine has written of (The Voice and the Eye, 
1977/81; and Return of the Actor, 1984/88); it results in new collective identity, new collective 
experience, and its juridification as law.[ n37]  
Habermas[ n38] points to the increasingly constitutive nature of modern law--constituting new spheres 
of action, rather than merely regulating preexisting institutional life. And thus, Habermas locates the 
self-constitution of society, the critical theory of the tradition of civil society, and the emancipatory 
project of practical reason in the juridico-discursive order. He does so in the name of lawfulness, in a 
grounded manner that preserves a sense of critique rather than in a non-reflective aesthetic, i.e., in an 
expressive sensibility which constantly questions its own being.  
The tradition of a critical sociology of law is both sustained and renewed by Habermas. This involves a 
reconstruction, not a deconstruction. This is a reconstruction of procedures involved in communicative 
interaction, in a juridico-discursive order that grounds our continuing sociality.  
A juridico-discursive order is a tradition of practical moral reflection that is neither the outmoded 
natural law that constrained reflection as to our social identity, nor the positivist/functionalist reduction 
of law to state codification that threatens our social identity. A juridico-discursive order presupposes a 
collective ethic of responsibility rooted in our mutual recognition of Rational Autonomy, beyond the 
instrumentalism of social contract thinking.[ n39] It presupposes and evokes normative understandings 
that enable us to take on our responsibility, to paradoxically increase disciplinary power--albeit, a self-
disciplinary power--and ward off coercive authoritarian state power.  
Habermas' strand of critical theory preserves the appeal to universal principles of a depth normative 
structure in the modern Western experience, to a hoped for solidarity in which commonality emerges in 
the forte of a broad orientation of shared claims.  
Beyond the contextualists' rationality of particular traditions and the Postmodernist celebration of 
entropy, localism and relativism, Habermas works to preserve the persistence of an independent logic of 
normative questions, the potential consensual rules for conflict regulation--if not resolution--and the 
idea of social justice.  
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